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Abstract
It is well known that security properties are not preserved by reﬁnement, and that reﬁnement
can introduce new, covert, channels, such as timing channels. The ﬁnalisation step in reﬁnement
can be analysed to identify some of these channels, as unwanted ﬁnalisations that can break the
assumptions of the formal model. We introduce a taxonomy of such unwanted ﬁnalisations, and
give examples of attacks that exploit them.
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1 Introduction
Reﬁnement is the standard process of transforming a speciﬁcation into ex-
ecutable code. A reﬁnement can be proved correct, meaning that all the
functional properties of the abstract are present in the concrete.
It is well known that security properties are not necessarily preserved by
classic reﬁnement [14]: widening the precondition may allow new, Trojan,
behaviour; peculiar resolutions of non-determinism may be used to leak secret
information. Additionally, as discussed in this paper, ﬁnalisation reﬁnements
may break the assumptions of the formal model, and allow information to
leak.
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Fig. 1. The relational model of reﬁnement
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Fig. 2. A simulation, used to prove reﬁnement
2 Finalisation and reﬁnement
2.1 The relational model of reﬁnement
The relational model of reﬁnement is cast in terms of a many-many relation
between an initial and ﬁnal global state. Reﬁnement is a relationship be-
tween an abstract program expressed in some abstract world that captures
this initial-to-ﬁnal relation, and an equivalent concrete program expressed in
the concrete world [11]. See ﬁgure 1.
In this relational model of reﬁnement, the reﬁnement relationship that
must hold between the two programs reduces to the subset relation between
the two global to global relations (whilst maintaining totality, so the empty
program is not a reﬁnement). That is, it is a resolution of non-determinism,
coupled with a change of data representation.
The existence of the subset relation is diﬃcult to prove, being expressed
over general sequences of operations, so a (forward or backward) simulation
is introduced, reducing the global proof obligation to three simpler ones: an
initialisation, a ﬁnalisation, and one for a single operation only (ﬁgure 2).
2.2 Finalisation and observability
The last part of the process, moving from the program world (be it abstract
or concrete) to the global world, is called ﬁnalisation. The ﬁnalisation step
deﬁnes what properties of the implementation world are observable. Only the
global world is observable in the original speciﬁcation relation. (Anything not
observable in the program world is there merely for implementation conve-
nience.)
J.A. Clark et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 137 (2005) 225–242226
In a speciﬁcation language like Z [24] [3], this simple relational model is
given additional structure so that parts of the relational state can be used to
model internal Z state, inputs, and outputs. Also, Z operations can be par-
tial relations. The reﬁnement proof obligations become correspondingly more
complicated [24], primarily by the introduction of an applicability (precondi-
tion) law to handle partial relations.
The traditional Z reﬁnement rules in [24] make certain simplifying assump-
tions [27] [25], leading to certain restrictions. In particular, the rules do not
permit any reﬁnement of the inputs or outputs, or any observation of state
except by inputs and outputs. (Technically, nothing at all is observed until the
ﬁnalisation step, at the end of the computation. But yet another simplifying
assumption, about the way the outputs are embedded in the relational world,
allows the sequence of independent outputs to be observed incrementally, as
each one happens, since nothing that occurs subsequently can change them.)
Under these assumptions, and for forward simulations [24], the ﬁnalisation
step reduces to the identity transformation on the outputs (the program out-
puts and the global world outputs are always identical, at both the abstract
and concrete levels), and the null function on the internal state (no internal
state is observable). Hence there is no explicit ﬁnalisation proof obligation in
the classic Z reﬁnement rule [24].
When these simplifying assumptions are relaxed, however, more general
reﬁnements are possible. For example, consider an abstract program that has
an operation that outputs a set, where the corresponding concrete operation
outputs a sequence. If the ﬁnalisation step for the abstract model is the
identity function (the set is observed), then the corresponding ﬁnalisation
step for the concrete program extracts the range of the sequence (collapsing
the sequence to the observed set).
In the reﬁnement process, the most abstract model usually has an identity
output ﬁnalisation (if it models the outputs in the most abstract way, that of
the global model). But in a series of stepwise reﬁnements, the concrete model
in one step becomes the abstract model in the next, and so both models can
soon have non-trivial ﬁnalisations.
The more general reﬁnement rules in [25] provide the proof obligations for
output reﬁnement. There is an explicit ﬁnalisation proof obligation, and a
need for a retrieve relation between abstract and concrete outputs.
2.3 Finalisation glasses
An intuitive explanation of the meaning of ﬁnalisation is as follows. Finalis-
ing the state can be thought of as “breaking open the device” and observing
its state, through “ﬁnalisation glasses” (or ﬁnalisation spectacles). Finalising
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Fig. 3. Generalised m:n simulation
the outputs can be thought of observing the outputs, through “ﬁnalisation
glasses”. These ﬁnalisation glasses transform the raw program values into the
corresponding global speciﬁcation values. In the earlier example, they trans-
form the concrete sequence into the global set. (As they transform mundane
brickwork into the Emerald City [4].)
Finalisation solves the old paradox of why the clock that is 5 minutes slow
(hence never right) is better than the stopped clock (right twice a day). The
ﬁrst clock has a simple ﬁnalisation that can be applied to it: add ﬁve minutes
to the displayed time. The second has no ﬁnalisation that produces a useful
result (without recourse to a second clock).
2.4 Other models
2.4.1 Schellhorn’s Generalised forward simulation, and breaking atomicity
Generalised forward simulation [22] allows arbitrary m:n diagrams between
abstract and concrete operations (ﬁgure 3), rather than the 1:1 diagrams as-
sumed above, with no requirement for the simulation to hold part way through.
So it is possible to have a single, atomic abstract operation reﬁned by a com-
pound sequence of concrete operations.
In the 1:1 relational model it is possible to ﬁnalise at any point. For a
correct reﬁnement in the m:n model, ﬁnalising part way through the sequence
of concrete operations (for example, by removing power from the device so
that it cannot continue functioning) should result in a state that corresponds
to no abstract change. However, we can also use this model to investigate the
consequences of breaking of the atomicity assumption.
2.4.2 CSP reﬁnement
CSP [12] [20] has a rather diﬀerent model of computation, in that there is no
explicit ﬁnalisation step, no ﬁnite end point to the computation: processes
can continue engaging in events without limit. But reﬁnement in CSP is still
dictated by what one chooses to observe.
In the simplest case, of traces reﬁnement, the chosen observations are just
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the traces of events, and the reﬁnement condition reduces to subsets of traces,
giving behaviour-equivalent processes. More sophisticated observations can
be made, each restricting the set of concrete processes that are allowed as
valid reﬁnements of the abstract. So failures reﬁnement additionally gives
deadlock-equivalent processes. Failures-divergences reﬁnement additionally
gives livelock-equivalent processes. In all these cases, the processes must have
the same alphabets, so there is no input/output reﬁnement. ([8] augments a
relational state model with an observed component that records these more
sophisticated observations, allowing these form of process reﬁnement to be
incorporated into the relational model.) There are more yet more sophisticated
observations possible, for example, including timing [19] or fairness [17].
In all these cases, however, the key thing is that the process is deﬁned by
what we chose to observe. The fact of whether a system is a reﬁnement of
another depends solely on those observations. So the arguments we make in
the rest of the paper also apply to CSP-style reﬁnements.
3 Unwanted ﬁnalisations in practice
3.1 Unwanted ﬁnalisations as covert channels
The speciﬁcation deﬁnes what is intended to be observable about the system,
and what is not. Parts of the system may be intended to be unobservable, often
for security reasons (for example, a secret cryptographic key). The speciﬁer
captures this property in terms of a ﬁnalisation.
Once the reﬁnement model constraints have been relaxed to include non-
trivial ﬁnalisations, it becomes easier to see how certain covert channels arise.
It may be possible to apply ﬁnalisations other than the intended one, in order
to observe diﬀerent information. Such ﬁnalisations may not provide formal
reﬁnements of the original models, but are important because they may be
performable in practice.
In the sequence/set example, what if you take oﬀ your ﬁnalisation glasses,
and observe the raw values actually output? You see the concrete sequence,
which has more information, because it orders its elements. If you can use that
order to deduce something about the internals of the system that are supposed
to be secret, you have observed a covert channel. You have performed an
unwanted ﬁnalisation (unwanted by the system owners, that is).
3.2 The maximal identity ﬁnalisation, and the Real World
The identity ﬁnalisation (no ﬁnalisation glasses) enables the most data to be
seen, within the modelling assumptions. By the time a very concrete level of
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model (or physical implementation) has been reached, there may be a remark-
able amount of data visible to other ﬁnalisations: not simply a bit-stream, but
also real world information outside the formal model, such as timing informa-
tion, or power consumption. Also, the actual ﬁnalisations possible depend on
the details of the implementation technology chosen.
Note that the maximal identity ﬁnalisation result is the case only for clas-
sical computation. Quantum ﬁnalisations are not composable: there is no
such thing as the maximal identity ﬁnalisation. The observation “collapses
the wavefunction”, rendering complementary variables no longer observable;
a diﬀerent observation might have given diﬀerent information, and so have
allowed diﬀerent inferences.
3.3 Variation in what you see
One might say, so do not allow output reﬁnement, do not allow non-trivial
ﬁnalisations. Yet an actual computing device does not output a set of abstract
values in some timeless domain; it outputs electrical signals over time. Re-
fusing to allow output reﬁnement requires either polluting the abstract model
using concepts at the level of electrical signals, or fudging the issue by imple-
menting the reﬁnement outside the mathematical analysis.
So, many covert channels can be considered as unwanted ﬁnalisations, as
being able to observe more in the implementation than is speciﬁed at the most
abstract level. This realisation can be used to help analyse covert channels,
and to prevent them. In the end, it is observations that cause breaches of
security. Information that aﬀects no agent cannot cause any harm. Finalisa-
tion formalises the notion of observation by external agents interacting with
the system. The adoption of various observation strategies can, therefore, be
viewed (modelled) as applying ﬁnalisations.
Arguing about the security of modern systems grows increasingly hard,
and there have been numerous surprises over the past decade in particular
(timing attacks [15], power attacks [16], etc). Systematic analysis is needed.
We provide a simple taxonomy, motivated by the formal reﬁnement models
presented earlier.
4 A taxonomy of unwanted ﬁnalisations
With any system there is an obvious ﬁnalisation: that intended by the speci-
ﬁer. This may give suﬃcient security (or it may not). It is, however, a choice,
and comes with its own assumptions about the system and its context. Con-
sidering other choices of system elements and context provides an interesting
and informative means of highlighting possible unwanted analyses.
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4.1 Varying the “ﬁnalisation glasses”
The intended observation is with the intended ﬁnalisation glasses (for ex-
ample, the discrete values produced by a crypto-algorithm). We can consider
the intended ﬁnalisation to correspond to the identity applied to the outputs
of the most abstract speciﬁcation. Unintended observations vary the ﬁnali-
sation glasses, and can observe discrete properties (for example, page faults,
interrupts, i/o buﬀers), or analogue properties (for example, power, timing,
RF).
The intended observations may be direct, of outputs from single ab-
stract operations. Or they may be enhanced, involving some degree of
post-processing, making use of information from sequences of abstract out-
puts, for example, cryptanalysis on millions of ciphertext blocks. Unintended
observations often also exploit an enhanced viewpoint.
We may take a single viewpoint (for example, power information) or mul-
tiple viewpoints (intended, power and timing together).
An invasive observation requires the analyst to force an additional ﬁnal-
isation channel, for example, dropping a hardware microprobe onto a circuit
track. Otherwise the observation is passive.
4.2 Varying the system being ﬁnalised
We may observe a standard system instance (operating in the intended man-
ner). Many innovative analyses have emerged, particularly over the past
decade, that involve a perturbed system (operating in some unintended man-
ner).
A perturbed instance may arise due to invasive or passive means. Fault
injection using an ion gun is clearly an invasive attack. A physical ﬂaw could
arise in the system due to manufacturing inadequacy or simply as a result of
wearout (things do sometimes just break).
Perturbed instances can result in unreachable states (as far as the model
is concerned). Atomic abstract operations may be implemented by a sequence
of concrete operations. Disruption part way through the concrete sequence of
operations (breaking abstract atomicity) may cause the system to end up in a
state that is unreachable in terms of the abstract model. This may permit all
manner of unwanted ﬁnalisations (immediate or subsequent). This applies not
only to general operations but also to initialisation (for example, interrupting
trusted startup). Lower level perturbations (for example, bit ﬂipping) can
result in unreachable concrete states.
A particular source of system variation is the chosen initialised system
state. This initial state may simply be insecure (for example, unfortunate
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default passwords or permissions).
We may choose to observe the operation of a single instance of a system
(for example, a single smart card) or multiple instances. The single instance
is the usual user view; an analyst may well prefer the multiple instance system,
allowing diﬀerentiated analyses. Instances of standard and perturbed systems
may be analysed together.
Multiple instances may be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Collections
of systems may play both roles at the same time (instances may be homoge-
neous from the intended viewpoint, but heterogeneous from an unintended
viewpoint). Heterogeneity may be engineered deliberately (for example, ma-
liciously by fault injection, or for commercial reasons such as running on dif-
ferent hardware platforms), or occur naturally (for example, because no two
processors of the same type are precisely the “same”).
4.3 Varying the environment
Many systems have speciﬁed environmental ranges for operation. For exam-
ple, smart cards have power supply speciﬁcations and operating temperature
ranges. Each attribute may be standard (within speciﬁcation) or perturbed
(out of speciﬁcation). Environmental variation provides opportunities for al-
tering the ﬁnalisation; for example, digital circuitry operates diﬀerently at
diﬀerent temperatures. Since we are generally dealing with ranges, there are
also possibilities for variation even within speciﬁcation.
We may choose to vary a single attribute, or multiple attributes, of the
environment.
Variation may be passive (for example, the climate is extremely cold), or
invasive (for example, a power supply deliberately modulated in an unhelpful
way, or the system deliberately heated).
We can be ﬂexible in our interpretation of the environment. The above
examples are expressed in terms of concrete environments. For an abstract
model, the environment could encompass elements such as assumptions about
operations of use, for example, that a system is subjected only to limited
demands, or that the users understand the system suﬃciently well not to
breach security inadvertently.
4.4 Varying the reﬁnement
Ideally, reﬁnements are carried out formally and correctly. But there is always
the possibility of erroneous reﬁnement (for example, stack overﬂows).
It is not always feasible to perform a pure reﬁnement: modelling assump-
tions have to be made at the abstract level that do not hold at a more concrete
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level, or in the implementation (for example, that voltage levels are precisely
binary). One formal technique attempting to handle deviations from pure re-
ﬁnement is retrenchment [2]. An interesting open problem is how much can
properties of interest be preserved under such circumstances.
4.5 Varying which system is ﬁnalised: higher order ﬁnalisations
Typically, the system being observed is the system being analysed. It is also
possible to make higher order observations. For example, the analysis tech-
niques themselves have standard and non-standard properties. One common
analysis technique is meta-heuristic guided search (genetic algorithms, simu-
lated annealing, etc) to ﬁnd a potential solution. A guided search has a ﬁnal
result, but also has a trajectory (the path followed to reach that result).
Viewing the search process merely as atomic throws away huge amounts
of information. Observing the search in action [7] can reveal far more. For
example, a search by simulated annealing may move around a key space by
considering moves one bit ﬂip away from the current one. As the process
“cools”, some key bits become stuck at particular values. The relative times
when particular bits become stuck can give a great deal of information about
the underlying secret solution sought. Even if search-based analyses “fail” (do
not ﬁnd the solution), repeated runs may provide results whose distribution
may allow the actual solution to be derived.
Analysis analogies can be found for other approaches too. For example,
perturbing the mathematics in some way ([7] uses the term problem warping)
and observing the results of searches can also give rise to new analyses. Thus,
a higher order analogue of fault injection may apply. Due to the way meta-
heuristic search proceeds, non-standard or highly perturbed cost functions
typically produced better overall results [7].
Some, possibly many, of the unwanted ﬁnalisations identiﬁed earlier may
have analogues when applied to the analysis processes. For example, what is
the equivalent of “power analysis” ﬁnalisations for analysis processes? The sys-
tematic application of our ﬁnalisation taxonomy to analysis/search approaches
may generate new analyses. This is currently under investigation.
5 Illustrating the taxonomy
In summary, the main points of our taxonomy cover the ﬁnalisation, the sys-
tem, or its environment being viewed as an individual or a collection, using
either a standard (intended), or a non-standard (unintended) view, the latter
of which may be brought about passively or actively. We now give examples
to illustrate our taxonomy. For presentation purposes we choose variation in
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the ﬁnalisation glasses, and number of systems under observation, as the main
classiﬁcations, and annotate the speciﬁc examples with other aspects, where
they are of a “non-standard” variety.
It is interesting to note that there are few such annotations, and even fewer
multiple annotations. Published analyses tend to exploit only a single view-
point, for example, unintended ﬁnalisations involving power or timing. There
appears to be little in the way of multiple viewpoint analyses, where timing
and power information, say, are used together. Given the considerable success
of the single aspect analyses, availing oneself of multiple sources and exploit-
ing correlations between them would seem a promising avenue to explore (if
one is an attacker).
5.1 Intended Finalisation, single system
This is the most common and obvious viewpoint. One simply observes the
normal abstractly deﬁned operation of a single system instance. No clever
tricks or sophisticated equipment are needed here. It is therefore crucial that
the intended ﬁnalisation is secure.
Enhanced: Security-breaching ﬁnalisations may occur due to resource
exhaustion. Suppose a directory can contain up to 1024 ﬁles. Some ﬁles
may be highly classiﬁed, and so invisible to a lowly classiﬁed user. But the
existence of n highly classiﬁed ﬁles limits the number of unclassiﬁed ﬁles that
can be created to 1024-n. Any attempt to create more fails with “directory
full”. Deleting a highly classiﬁed ﬁle then allows a lowly classiﬁed ﬁle to be
created. We have therefore the basis of a covert channel when observed over
sequences of operations. Similar considerations apply to memory exhaustion,
and ﬁle-locks.
Erroneous reﬁnement. For systems such as cryptosystems a great deal
of eﬀort goes into ensuring that particular known (to the designers at least)
ﬁnalisations are intractable. There remains the possibility of a “trapdoor” or
ﬂaw in the algorithm: the given speciﬁcation does not capture the intent. A
hashing algorithm may simply be ﬂawed, allowing an easy break.
Enhanced, erroneous reﬁnement: Although particular analyses may
require trillions or more data points, it may be that knowledge of the cipher-
texts corresponding to, say, one hundred very speciﬁc chosen plaintexts suﬃces
to leak a particular key bit.
Perturbed system: [6] describes how fault injection on a crypto system
(causing some internal state bit to ﬂip) could be used to break RSA and other
algorithms.
Perturbed user: Even when a system works as speciﬁed and is considered
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secure, lack of security understanding by the user may cause problems. There
have been many examples of social engineering (“cognitive hacking”) attacks,
where the user is persuaded to carry out actions favourable to the attacker.
5.2 Intended ﬁnalisation, multiple systems
A cryptographic key’s use may be limited on any speciﬁc smart card, but
access to 10000 smart cards all with the same key may signiﬁcantly aﬀect
cryptanalysis. Also, access to 10000 processors may radically aﬀect the prob-
ability of a successful analysis, for example, the various distributed searches
for prime factors for the RSA challenges.
Traﬃc analysis most naturally consists of observation of multiple systems.
Even if the content of messages over a network is encrypted, analysis of net-
work source and destination ﬁelds leaks information. (One could instead view
this as a single networked system with multiple probes, distributed around
the system.)
5.3 Unintended ﬁnalisation, single system
Many speciﬁcations assume that operations are atomic. In practice, diﬀerent
atomic operations may take varying amounts of time to compute. The most
high proﬁle exploitation of this has been Kocher’s timing attack [15] on ex-
ponentiation; the analysis exploits the fact that the time taken to carry out
exponentiation is data dependent (and the detailed form of that dependence
does not need to be known).
There may be timing attacks on the ﬁnalisation operation itself. How
long does it take to compute a ﬁnalisation that is more complicated than the
identity? A directory listing operation invoked by an unclassified process
might need to ﬁlter out the names of more highly classiﬁed ﬁles. Although
the listing may output only unclassified ﬁles, the time taken to complete
may depend on the presence of more highly classiﬁed ﬁles.
Analysis can measure power ﬂuctuations during computation (between
output events) [16], which might be correlated with something internally se-
cret.
Consider the TENEX password attack (see, for example, [9]). The pass-
word is checked byte by byte, and the check aborts if an incorrect byte is
found. If the password is located in memory that crosses a page boundary, a
page fault is generated only if all initial bytes on the ﬁrst page are correct. If
such conﬁgurations can be engineered then an unintended ﬁnalisation that ob-
serves the paged faults is possible. Similar analyses may also apply to timing
considerations if protocol message ﬁelds are validated incrementally.
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Some safe locks require discs to be rotated to speciﬁc positions in a par-
ticular order to release the door. The modelling assumption is that the only
observation is success or failure in opening the safe door. Film-goers, or bank
robbers, reading this will realise that a safecracker using a stethoscope to lis-
ten to the tumblers when the discs are rotated is performing an unintended
ﬁnalisation.
It is common to assume that analysts have ideal conditions for performing
their ﬁnalisations, but we must be very careful in deﬁning “ideal”. A user may
normally be unable to monitor the timing performance of a process in action
at suﬃcient granularity to breach security. If other users access the system,
however, this slows down the actual rate of execution, and could make timing
analysis tractable. Such cooperative analyses may be unwitting. What might
be viewed as “denial of service” here becomes “provision of attack capability”!
[1] provides an account of a crypto attack in which execution is monitored one
step at a time (with resets in between), to enable electron microscopes of
limited sophistication to be used.
Perturbed environment: In the early 1980s it was found that the con-
tents of static RAM could persist for up to minutes after power is removed
if the temperature were reduced to below −20˚C [1]. Perturbed system:
There are accounts of RAM contents maintained at a speciﬁc value being
burned in: when the RAM is powered up about 90% of relevant bits assume
their previous values. A variation on this remanence theme should be familiar
to many whose experience includes VT100 terminals: the login prompt burnt
onto the screen.
Perturbed environment: the power consumption proﬁle of a cryptosys-
tem may leak more information if the system is cooled, since thermal noise is
reduced. Perturbed system: temperature variation may be used to cause
the basic circuitry to malfunction (for example, by overheating), or to alter
its timing properties (for example, temperature induces time-dependencies in
FPGA circuitry [26]). Interference with the power supply, or with a supplied
clock frequency, may cause system malfunction (for example, the so-called
glitch attacks).
Retrenchment: Hardware implementations typically use analogue ap-
proximations to logical concepts. Consider the operation of hard disk storage.
We view data logically as binary 0/1 values; values are physically stored by af-
fecting the magnetic properties of locations on a disc. Under detailed scrutiny
minor variations in disc head positioning may leave visible traces of previous
recorded data despite that data being “overwritten”. Binary values are im-
plemented by analogue ranges, for example, binary 1 may be represented by a
voltage range of 4.5–5.5V. In communications, a message may logically com-
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prise a stream of 0s and 1s, where the logical abstraction is a step-function, but
the analogue implementation is not. In principle, the analogue waveform may
encode inﬁnite information ignored by the system’s internal interpretational
mechanisms. Variation in the rise and holding times can be analysed.
Invasive observations: the ability to drop a single microprobe often
suﬃces to break a cryptosystem (for example, knowledge of a single bitplane
suﬃces to break algorithms such as RSA [10]). Electron microscopes have
been used to read voltages on smart card chip surfaces. Thermal imaging is
used to evaluate the reliability of ASICs, as hot spots are likely to fail ﬁrst; can
such diﬀerences be correlated with logical dynamics (for example, frequency
of ﬂipping)? What are the possibilities for detecting minor magnetic ﬁeld
diﬀerences?
5.4 Unintended ﬁnalisation, multiple systems
No two processors are identical in all their performance characteristics (even if
they are of the same type). Obvious sources of variation are: clock speed; on-
chip cache capacity; timing; pipelining; power consumption. Measurements
of an algorithm running on diﬀerent architectures, or on diﬀerent physical
instantiations of the same architecture, could be correlated to provide extra
information (a “diﬀerential processor attack”).
For messages over a network the intended ﬁnalisation is the content, but
messages also have length, and appear on the LAN at a particular times or
intervals. Variation in these can leak information too.
6 Preventing Unwanted Finalisations
6.1 Make it impossible, or infeasible, or meaningless, to observe
The most obvious and direct approach is to enforce the use of the intended
ﬁnalisation glasses. These may, for example, form a layer between electrical
signals and what the analyst can observe. Invasive attacks may be prevented,
or made more diﬃcult, by a variety of means. For example, smart cards may
have resin coatings applied, and be encircled with tamper-detection coils.
Overwhelming the resources of an analyst provides another means of eﬀect-
ing security. For example, user A may communicate with B by very rapidly
sending trillions of bits of potential key material having secretly agreed previ-
ously which time slot contains the actual key to be used. An attacker without
this knowledge could observe all the data but would not be able to store it all
for future reference.
The system may ensure that any ﬁnalisation an analyst can do does not
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leak any unwanted ﬁnalisation. So any (practical) alternative ﬁnalisations are
not “unwanted”. In the sequence/set example, the system might deliberately
randomise the order of the sequence, or impose a particular order, so that an
analyst cannot “see” any other underlying order. (One would then have to
consider the eﬀect this might have on timing ﬁnalisations.)
6.2 Intractable ﬁnalisations
In some cases, the information needed to do that intended ﬁnalisation is secret.
The output is encrypted, and the “ﬁnalisation glasses” require the use of a
secret key to work. The identity ﬁnalisation appears to be “noise”, and only
some privileged people have the ability to do the intended ﬁnalisation.
The prevention is trying to stop the analyst “putting on” the glasses. The
analyses try to get enough information to be able to put on the glasses.
6.3 Managing attacks
If an attack is detected, evasive action might be needed. A soft way to do this
is to “slug” the system: simply slow down the covert channel (for example, by
reducing processor time allocated to the suspicious process). This may allow
you to “play for time” whilst managerial action is taken. Another example
is deliberate slugging of network requests to the system to prevent resource
exhaustion.
For systems where management is not available (for example, smart cards
held by the population at large), destructive action may be needed. For ex-
ample, on detection of tampering, shared key material is destroyed, say by
overwriting memory. In some military systems explosives may be used to ren-
der useful ﬁnalisations impossible. Explosive partial destruction may on the
other hand form an attack technique, for example, by rapid destruction of the
supporting mechanisms used to overwrite memory. (When will we see the ﬁrst
high velocity ‘micro-bullet’ attack on a smart card?)
7 Unusual ﬁnalisations
We have, perhaps, given the impression that covert channels are “a bad thing”.
This really depends on who you are. In some cases more powerful ﬁnalisation
can be a source of security as well as a source of insecurity.
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7.1 Diﬀerent ﬁnalisations, diﬀerent reﬁnements
A speciﬁcation may include several diﬀerent intended ﬁnalisations, to deﬁne
what is to be observed by diﬀerent classes of user, or in diﬀerent circumstances.
Multiple reﬁnements, capturing the multiple ﬁnalisations, are then possible.
For example, a system might be provided with two intended ﬁnalisations: an
ordinary user ﬁnalisation, and a special administrator ﬁnalisation that can
observe more of the system, such as other users’ data, and audit trails. In
general, there may be privilege-dependent ﬁnalisations: for example, diﬀerent
security clearance providing a ﬁlter (the more clearance you have, the less
dark are your ﬁnalisation glasses).
An atomic abstract operation might be implemented in a multiple step
concrete operation. Breaking atomicity by ﬁnalising part way through the
sequence of concrete operations could yield a useful partial result (accurate,
but not yet as precise as that speciﬁed) that could be valuably observed (for
example, the partial loading of certain image ﬁles by Web browsers).
7.2 Finalising the user
Consider hand signatures. It is relatively easy to forge a facsimile (the intended
visual ﬁnalisation) but very diﬃcult to forge the signature dynamics (speed,
acceleration, pressure). So observing the dynamics can give a more secure
signature authentication system.
Similarly, keyboard dynamics can be used as source of continuous authen-
tication (a modern day equivalent of recognising Morse code operators from
their signalling styles). A user’s typing patterns could be observed and used as
the basis of continuous authentication. The user does not consciously “supply”
this information when at the terminal, and should not be able to successfully
spoof another user. Or alternatively, this observation might be used as a kind
of “audio Tempest” attack. It can be an interesting exercise to (occasionally)
ask people who enter one’s oﬃce to close their eyes and try to guess what keys
are being pressed on one’s computer keyboard. Everyone is able to recognise
a spacebar: how would more sophisticated acoustic analyses perform?
Written text has been analysed to verify claims of authorship. The usual
ﬁnalisation is semantic content, but more detailed linguistic processing (an
enhanced ﬁnalisation) can be applied.
In a sense, we may view the above as unintended ﬁnalisations of the user.
We must consider what the security policy of the system is to decide whether
this is a good thing or not. If anonymity is a security requirement, then such
authentication channels would be viewed in a poor light. There is also an
issue as to diﬀerences between stated policy and actual policy. The general
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user may simply be unaware that they are being ﬁnalised in an unintended
(by them) way.
7.3 Destructive quantum ﬁnalisation
Quantum computing achieves great potential power by simultaneously acting
on superpositions of states. Here ﬁnalisation is an act of measurement, caus-
ing projection onto one of a number of subspaces (the state space is often said
to “collapse”). The particular projection witnessed is probabilistic. Quantum
computer scientists do not normally talk in terms of ﬁnalisation; [21]’s provi-
sion of ﬁnalisation as part of their quantum guarded command language forms
a welcome bridge to classical formal methods.
The destructiveness of quantum ﬁnalisation is at the heart of security of
quantum-related systems. It forms, for example, the basis for detection of
eavesdropping in quantum key distribution protocols [18].
8 Conclusions
We have shown how ﬁnalisation can be viewed as a crucial formal framework
for explaining many security-related aspects of systems. We have examined the
power of various ﬁnalisations, enabling factors and countermeasures. Above
all we have shown that ﬁnalisation is a practical as well as a formal issue.
When we do formal speciﬁcation and reﬁnement we are working on formal
models of an envisaged system. Each model comes complete with a set of
assumptions. These may be particular to the application concerned or else
derive from the semantics of the representations used. If the assumptions do
not hold (or can be made not to hold) in an implementation then we have
the basis of an attack. Our taxonomy and many of the attacks outlined (for
example, multiple systems) indicate that a useful criterion for formal analysis
may be to model the system not as the user is expected to access it, but as
an attacker may view it.
We have summarised a variety of ways in which abstract assumptions can
be broken, and provided a taxonomy that may be used to categorise attacks.
It is well known that vulnerabilities come from “incomplete” modelling. Our
taxonomy should provide a mechanism for reasoning about which aspects of
a model may be incomplete.
As Jackson [13] points out, the world is unbounded. There is a richer set of
experiences to be had in the implementation (physical) world. The quest for
attackers is to sample that richness, in order to avail themselves of correlations
and relationships with data of interest.
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As technology gets ever more sophisticated, opportunities for analysis in-
crease. Other computing paradigms aﬀect ﬁnalisations. DNA computing algo-
rithms to break DES have been suggested [5]. Quantum computing increases
what is tractable, for example, Shor’s polynomial time Quantum Discrete
Fourier Transform [23] renders factorisation tractable, on a quantum com-
puter. We cannot know where future technology-dependent ﬁnalisations will
take us.
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